Celtic forms, Latin and Anglo-Saxon followed one another, but Norman French was unable to oust Anglo-Saxon, though it left a deposit of legal phrases and helped to make English grow towards the remarkable amalgam of Teutonic and Romance elements that it now is, though much of this growth came during the Renaissance. Roumania is in a sense an analogous amalgam of Latinised and Slavonic elements. The survival of the older, Latin, element is an interesting fact.

The Roumanian people, as we may begin to call them, were spread over the Carpathian bastion, using the high pastures in summer, so that contacts were maintained over long distances, independently of adjacent peoples more specially concerned with farming in lowland villages. It is a Roumanian theory, with much probability behind it, that the summer life on the upland pastures has had not a little to do with the survival of the Latin element to such a degree in Roumania, and with the survival of the Roumanian people's consciousness of themselves as distinct from their neighbours. It is noteworthy that groups of Germans, Szeklers, and so on, spreading in the Carpathian bastion later on, when Christianity had come to this part of the world, have not changed their language, nor have they caused their neighbours to change theirs. The resistance to language-change has become too great.

In the days when Latin and Slavonic were, as it were, competing in and around the Carpathian bastion, Christianity was expanding from Rome and Constantinople, with characteristic differences, only some of which concern us here. In the west, Roman cities had grown, often from camps, ere the empire fell, and cities tended to acquire bishops, for whom the Roman tradition was their main link with the larger world. The insistence on the general language (Latin) for religious purposes and the growth in authority and prestige of the Bishop of Rome are thus easy to understand. And the combination gave the bishop's city a prestige that helped to Christianise barbarian conquerors and to spread the idea of the city when a revival began in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the east there was less spread of the idea of the city northward from Constantinople and the Ægean, save in the case of the cities on a Greek basis in south Russia. Nor was there the same spread of a general language. We accordingly find that the Church consecrated Slavonic forms,

POLITICAL PARTIES

Bulgarian Prime Minister Stambuliiski, in order to weld it 665
together and impart to it the driving energy of a revolutionary party. Fortunately for Rumania, its peasantry was led by a man who is remarkable not only for his common sense, but also for his extreme frankness, sincerity and modesty, and who in the midst of unparalleled corruption leads and insists on living a clean life. His devotion to the ideal he serves explains his readiness to relegate himself to the background whenever he believes that his self-effacement can be conducive to the advancement of his party or to the welfare of his country. He grasped the dangers inherent in an extremist policy for a country which had not yet firmly consolidated its various constituent segments, nor secured the spiritual unity of its people, and instead of following the easy course of giving a free rein to the hotheads of his party, he used his authority instead to curb their revolutionary zeal. M. Ion Mihalache, a former teacher by profession, foresaw that the wisest policy was to secure the adherence to the Peasant Party of various groups and public men who by their moral standing might add to its prestige, and by their influence help to exert a restraining force on its revolutionary activities. Such individuals were unfortunately inexistent in the old kingdom with the solitary exception of Prof. Iorga, who for over forty years had been performing the combined functions of a national tribune and a moralist. Mihalache, therefore, had to turn to the newly incorporated provinces, though his decision to co-operate with outsiders and facilitate their access to the government of the country created intense resentment in the old kingdom. Of the new territories, 186
Transylvania alone had been distinguished for its tenacious 665
defence of its nationality under Hungarian rule. It possessed a National party which for fifty years had battled heroically against Magyar despotism, and had been purified and tempered through the endless persecution it had been subjected to. Such a political group was ideally designed to serve as the nucleus of a larger party aiming at the emancipation of the Rumanian people from the oligarchy which persisted in exploiting it both politically and economically. The National Party of Transylvania, though naturally including intellectuals, was mainly a peasant party itself,

[186] 665 since it was a purely Rumanian party and represented proportionately all strata of the population, while Transylvania formed part of Hungary. Those of its adherents who pursued their personal advancement rather than that of their party had deserted it, and on the union of Transylvania with Rumania they joined the ranks of the various political groups of the old kingdom, believing that such conduct would be conducive to more rapid promotion for them. The party had thereby been purged of all doubtful elements, and those who remained could be considered as absolutely devoted to their ideal, namely the emancipation of the Rumanian democracy from a tyranny, which, though no longer Magyar, was to liberal-minded men perhaps even more stifling and more repulsive than that exerted of old [187] from Budapest. The Transylvanian National Party should not be mistaken on account of its name, for a group permeated by narrow nationalistic views; on the contrary, in respect to treatment of racial minorities in Rumania, it aims at securing for them the widest possible autonomy compatible with the maintenance of the Rumanian State. The majority of its rank and file being composed of peasants, its union with the Peasant party of Rumania was an occurrence which was bound to happen, fostered as it was through a community of suffering and an identity of desires. From every point of view the fusion of these two parties may be regarded as the most hopeful portent in Rumanian political life in recent times.

It was particularly felicitous also for the Transylvanian section since it afforded it an opportunity to repudiate the charge of cherishing separatist tendencies. The new group undoubtedly represents the most numerous and sanest elements in Rumania. The predominance of the Transylvanian intellectuals in it is due to the fact that these men are conscious of their civic duties, that they are resolved to serve their less developed peasant brethren and to bear their burdens in common, rather than to hoist themselves up into oligarchic groups intent on exploiting the rural masses. When the intellectuals of the old kingdom learn to subordinate their personal interest to that of their country, they will

665 equal footing. The development of railway communications was to be achieved by the granting of complete and effective autonomy to the railway administration, and in certain cases even the construction and exploitation of new lines was to be left to private enterprise.

M. Maniu, the leader of the party, has temporarily withdrawn from political life as a sign of protest against the unconstitutional methods adopted by the King. In spite of persistent and recurring demonstrations on the part of his followers, M. Maniu has refused to reconsider his decision, but his post of president of the party is being kept vacant in the belief, that eventually a return to constitutional methods will permit him to emerge from his self-imposed exile in Transylvania and to resume his political activities. The latter region, having evolved under Magyar rule an alert public opinion, has recently been the scene of imposing political manifestations, in the course of which the most profound and touching attachment for M. Maniu has been evinced. The latter has consistently counselled moderation to his followers, expressing his confidence that the King would in time perceive his mistake and return to constitutional methods. The Transylvanians form the better educated and more enlightened section of Rumania's population, and therefore it should not be surprising that they should be both more vigilant and restive. Already voices are raised advocating the abandonment of the passive policy of dignified abstention as prescribed by M. Maniu, and a revision of the tactics hitherto followed is demanded. It is probable that the whole party will come round to this view, as Bucarest has been incapable of either formulating a generous policy or, what is even more difficult, of carrying it into effect. This latent possibility of the appearance of a militant opposition headed by the National Peasant Party is not, it seems, too remote, for the Transylvanians are dissatisfied not only with the present régime, but also with the general attitude adopted towards them by politicians of the old kingdom. In a congress of the Transylvanian section of the party, held at Cluj at the end of March, 1932, M. Vaida-Voevod declared " we clearly see that there exists a conspiracy which premeditates the undermining of the forces of

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Transylvania

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Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit and lord over us."

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it is several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

652 quate means at their disposal they yet succeeded in achieving a certain measure of success, and notwithstanding the tremendous difficulties with which they had to cope. Some of the issues demanding attention were the reorganization of the administrative machinery in the newly-annexed territories, the complete overhauling of means of communication, the readjustment of agriculture, the reconstruction of the oil industry, which had greatly suffered during the war, and the necessity of providing for the needs of the army owing to the exposed geographical position of the country.

RUMANIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY

186 454 Until the advent to power in 1928 of the National Peasant Party under M. Maniu, the policy of the country was inspired by an uncompromising nationalism that tended to the complete exclusion of foreign capital so necessary for the development of Rumania. The chief instigators of this policy were the late brothers John and Vintila Bratianu, who had raised the maxim "prin noi insine" (by ourselves alone) to the sanctity of a religious dogma. The governments that had succeeded each other since the conclusion of the war, with the exception of the one presided over by M. Vaida-Voevod, were either formed by the Bratianu, or so-called Liberal Party, or by some nominees of theirs who were quite amenable to their views, so that a certain sequence in the policy pursued may be detected throughout this period, in spite of the change of persons at the helm of the State, while any divergence in their pronouncements from the original programme may be explained by the desire to allay the mistrust engendered by the Bratianu policy. The principal aim of this policy was the attainment of self-sufficiency through the industrialization of the country. This found expression in extensive legislation dealing with the development of national resources, the chief enactment being the special mining law promulgated in July, 1924.

382 471 315 The subsoil resources had already been declared national property, and the special mining law, which was aimed par-

maritime and fluvial shipping companies, the docks, ports, warehouses, and grain elevators of Braila, Galatz, and Constantsa.

Laws were drafted aiming at the commercialization and exploitation, either independently or in co-operation with the State, of these State-owned properties, as well as of other national resources. But the purpose which actuated the entire economic legislation enacted by the Bratianu Governments was that of preventing foreign capital from acquiring a dominant position in the country. This policy of restraining the activities of foreign capital by legal restrictions was not due to the fact that Rumania might be imperilled by foreign capital securing a preponderating influence, but mainly because the Bratianu party aimed at reserving for themselves the monopoly of such profits as could be made through the exploitation of the national resources. The direct result of this policy was to sink whatever Rumanian capital existed in big enterprises, while agriculture was entirely neglected, and to deplete completely the liquid assets of the country to such an extent that its credit organization was dislocated.

It is sad to record that during the years when there was a plethora of capital seeking investment which could have been easily attracted to Rumania with the object of endowing her with an adequate equipment for the development of her immense resources, such narrow and selfish views should have prevailed among her rulers. Indeed, had the opposite policy been adopted it would have secured prosperity to her even during the lean years which are now upon us. Foreign capital naturally fought shy, and refused to be enticed into enterprises in which it was not allowed to exercise legitimate control, which in many instances would have proved both salutary and indispensable. Rumania's natural wealth certainly provides a basis for industrial activity, there is an abundance of raw material, fuel, as well as a supply of cheap labour, but there is a serious deficiency of capital, which is reflected by the high rates of interest prevalent. Commercial bills were discounted at rates varying between 18 per cent and 30 per cent, and first mortgages were concluded on the basis of an average interest of 20 per

10: Logio S-4 (no date) 1932 ED1 Rumania ED1

duce remuneratively on the basis of present world prices. 433
At first sight it would appear that the simplest solution would be the abandonment of the present policy. An alleviation of the burden imposed on the peasantry would reduce drastically their costs of production and would better enable them to adjust the price of their produce to the prevailing world prices. If capital were withdrawn from industry and applied instead to the improvement of the means of cultivation, or to the diversification and intensification of agricultural production, Rumanian agricultural produce would be in a better position than at present to meet competition in neutral markets. It is true that as a result of the present tendency among industrial states to develop their own agricultural resources, and to curtail imports of agricultural produce by raising their tariff barriers, agrarian countries find it increasingly difficult to market their produce. Yet there is a possibility for the latter to secure regular markets if they would give up in exchange their attempts at general industrialization; and it is surprising that so far no understanding has been arrived at on these lines between industrial and agricultural countries, both parties persisting in a policy that is mutually ruining them. The adherents of the policy (184)
of industrialization partly explain their attitude by the necessity of severing all connection with former enemy states like Hungary, since the latter country would use commercial intercourse to further its irredentist propaganda in the territory which has reverted to Rumania. It is also partly explained by the necessity of making the country as self-supporting as possible so as to render it independent of foreign help in case of another war. So military considerations also tend to intensify economic nationalism, and as the military are fairly powerful and can make themselves heard there is little hope of a change in the policy which is being pursued. This policy of economic nationalism seems therefore to be, on the one hand, the direct outcome of the unbridled nationalism actually existing, and on the other, the result of a surreptitious understanding between politicians and profiteers to despoil the public, as the *Cuvantul* points out in the article quoted a little higher.

There are of course men of independent character who 000

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
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181 shown that they possess qualities equal to those of other nations, and they still do. These forces are dormant, covered, as it were, by a thick skin which has grown as a result of blows which had to be suffered and could not be parried. If and when the strain becomes too great, and when opportunity comes, then this people may discover its power and, if it be well led, form a healthy State.

669 Up to now this[a] has never happened: the people
• 186 has never won against its oppressors. And this is a factor which has been ever present in Rumanian history. The peasant revolt which broke out amongst the Rumanians in Transylvania in 1785, four years before the French Revolution, ended in complete defeat. The national movement of Tudor Vladimirescu in 1820 resulted in little more than the appointment of Rumanian, instead of Greek, princes to the thrones of Moldavia and Wallachia. The revolutions of 1848 were speedily crushed by the combined forces of the great empires and, in the case of the Rumanians of Transylvania, were used in the most cunning way to defeat the national movement of another people. The union of Wallachia and Moldavia, one of the most genuine aims of the whole Rumanian people, was achieved in the end less by popular forces than by intrigues and international diplomacy. The Great Peasant Revolt of 1907 was put down by the military and cost thousands of peasants' lives. The Land Reforms of 1917 were accepted by a parliament which contained not one single peasant; and they were carried out by one of the richest landowners of Rumania, who, with his associates, had certainly no intention of applying them in such a way as to diminish the power of his

[a] [i.e: the formation of a healthy State -- Analyst]

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
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class over the countryside. The union of all Rumanians in one State was a long-cherished dream. Its realization was only partly due to the actions of the people; Greater Rumania was the result of the greediness of the country's rulers, supported by the anti-Soviet policy of many countries. It carried the seed of its own destruction; and, when disruption came and the popular forces rose to assert their will in 1940, they were again defeated. In place of the royal dictatorship came the dictatorship of Rumanian and German Fascism: in place of partial economic domination by the west came complete domination by Germany.

One of the greatest barriers to the progress and well-being of Rumania and the Rumanians has been the fact that the geographical position and the wealth of the country have made it the victim of the ambitions of Great Powers. Rumanian governments have sided more often than not with the national enemies of their people and have at best tried to play off one of their foreign protectors against the other.

Yet it is exactly the geographical position and the great wealth of Rumania, combined with the hardiness and strength of its inhabitants, which hold out the promise of a happier future. The material and human resources for such a development are abundant. What is necessary is the liberation of these material and human forces under disinterested leadership. If that happens, if the unlucky chain of unsuccessful revolutions is broken; if these forces conquer those of their corrupt rulers, and the unhealthy social system of exploitation and oppression is replaced by the government of the people for the

A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

UNTIL 1940 Romania, a strong force for peace, contained within her boundaries all her historical domain and most of her people. In 1940, amid world-wide changes, she saw her racial and territorial unity shattered in a partition involving not less than one-third of her population of 20,000,000 and of her territory of 113,917 square miles.

The beneficiaries of this forcible division were Russia and Hungary.[1] On July 3, 1940, following an ultimatum, Russia invaded northern Bucovina, part of the Moldavian county of Dorohoi, and all of Bessarabia, altogether some 17,000 square miles with upward of 3,750,000 inhabitants. On September 13, 1940, following the Vienna arbitration decision of August 30, Hungary occupied half of Romanian Transylvania, again some 17,000 square miles with almost 2,400,000 inhabitants.

The two squeezes from east and west, timed to coincide with the collapse of the last vestiges of the European system of regional guarantees, could not be opposed by Romania. The retirement of her armies from Bucovina and Bessarabia reflected the realities of the situation, but did not imply a renunciation of her historic rights to the lost provinces, nor was this loss ratified formally by her parliament. On the contrary, Premier General Ion Antonescu, several times in his earliest official statements, reasserted Romania's claim to the whole of Transylvania; and less than one year later, on June 22, 1941, he led the Romanian armies in the liberation of Bucovina and Bessarabia.

The problems which the action of Russia and Hungary has restored to an acute phase are as old as the ideologies that give them form. Heretofore, as local problems, they have been allowed to smolder under temporary solutions enforced in high-handed and arbitrary manner. Today, as obstacles to the peace and progress of the world, they have become world problems. As such they require a lasting solution that must accord with

[1] A rectification of the frontier of Dobrudja accepted by Romania and Bulgaria as a permanent settlement of the differences between them was effected by the treaty signed at Craiova September 7, 1940. The treaty provided for the return to Bulgaria of the two counties of Caliacra and Durostor ceded by her to Romania at Bucharest, July 27, 1913, at the end of the Balkan wars from which Bulgaria emerged with a net territorial gain of 6,052 sq. mi. Provision was also made for a wide exchange of populations. Bulgaria also undertook to pay Romania one billion lei as indemnity for losses resulting from the territorial transfer and to take over the maintenance of the Romanian graves and battle monuments dating from the 1877-78 war to which Bulgaria owes the restoration of her statehood.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
Rumania EDI

Evidently this is only one of the *façons de parler* which Revai explained are permissible when it is inconvenient to call things "by their real names." Someday naked force will become convenient, and then the peasants will have to give in or starve. Their remarkable toughness is shown by the fact that they have been able to sustain their present position so long. With an egg selling at 2 lei and shoes costing 2,400 lei, a farmer must sell a hundred dozen eggs to get himself a new pair of shoes; and it takes a year's crop of wheat (in a good season at that) for the owner of an average-size farm to pay for a suit of store clothes. Tough as they are, the majority who still stand aside will have to knuckle under eventually and give up their land. Others will be channelled off to work on state construction jobs, and others again will be absorbed into factories. Some doubtless will hold out to the end—angry, bewildered and inarticulate, helpless to do anything but die. Millions died in Russia.

Nationalism will also continue to be something of a factor, but in Rumania it probably will not give the Communists particular trouble. Rumanians have always considered Russia an enemy of the Rumanian nation. But if nationalism can be held in check in countries with much greater native capacities of resistance, Poland for instance, how much less chance is there for it to remain alive and aggressive here in Rumania—the first of the satellites to come under Soviet occupation, the first to receive a Communist-controlled government imposed by Moscow, the one which today comes closest to being on the same political level as the Ukrainian or the Usbek Soviet Socialist Republic?

In March 1950 Patrascanu's name came back into public discussion as a result of reports in *Borba* and other Belgrade journals that he was to be made the chief performer in a spectacular trial on the Rajk and Kostov model. The reason these predictions did not materialize probably was that Moscow did not see pressing reasons to give Rumania any more lessons for the present. If Patrascanu should be tried later for nationalism, Titoism or spying for the West it would be because the people were starving and because when bread is lacking they must be given a circus. It will not indicate that there is (or probably ever has been) a very strong current of inde-